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I feel wealthy: a major determinant of Portuguese 
households' indebtedness?  
 
This paper examines the relationship between household’s house prices 
perception and the size of the household debt, using data from the first wave of 
the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. While the existing literature has 
focused mainly on the effects of housing wealth on consumption, we concentrate 
on debt levels, distinguishing mortgage debt from non-mortgage debt, and 
investigating over-indebtedness. Different measures of housing wealth appraisal 
are considered, controlling for tenure years. The findings reveal that housing 
wealth effects differ by type of loans and with the measure of housing wealth.  
Over-indebtedness is driven by the same factors that determine mortgage debt, 
suggesting a strong association between having outstanding liabilities from the 
primary residence and the risk of entering into default. Further estimations by 
different income and wealth levels revealed dissimilar housing wealth effects on 
the level of households’ outstanding liabilities, the size of non-mortgage debt 
tending to raise with lower income and the level of accumulated over-debt tending 
to be larger among the wealthier. 
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Until the 2007-2008 global economic crisis, advanced economies experienced a 
period of increased liquidity and unprecedentedly low interest rates in which 
household debt accumulated at a rate faster than GDP growth. Alongside, house 
prices kept rising steadily, even achieving alarming levels in several countries, 
while new mortgage contracts made housing less prohibitive, inflating the share 
of homeowners among the total population. In the aftermath of the crisis, indebted 
households felt the pressure to sell their residential properties at low market 
values, several of them often incurring losses to avoid defaulting, contributing to 
a climate of instability that was to be heavily blamed on their former financial 
choices.  
These occurrences and the acknowledgment that within developed 
countries housing wealth accounts for about half of households wealth, and that it 
tended to move together with aggregate consumption after the II World War 
(Iacoviello, 2005), motivated a surge of models that study the macroeconomic 
impacts of housing and the housing market (e.g. Kivedal, 2014; Kuang, 2014; 
Christensen et al., 2016; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2016; Guerrieri and 
Iacoviello, 2017; Lambertini et al, 2017). In the class of DSGE models, housing is 
included among households’ preferences, the effects of credit shocks on 
households’ decisions are tested, and the relationship between rising house prices 
expectations and their actual increase is checked.  Often, an expansion of housing 
wealth from increases in housing prices is shown to smooth collateral constraints, 
and to fuel debt-driven consumption. 
By placing households’ choices at the heart of the mechanism that explains 
the business cycle, these models have ascertained the need to test their results 
with microdata. In tandem, empirical studies have been corroborating the impact 
that housing price changes can have on households’ consumption, investment, and 
borrowing decisions (Case et al, 2005; Mian at al, 2013) and on their financial 
behaviours in general (Campbell, 2006). When homeowners face the house price 
appreciation as a permanent capital gain, they change their consumption levels 
responding to both the positive effect they perceive on their lifetime wealth and 
to the reduction of the real value of their outstanding liabilities (mostly with a 
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mortgage). Moreover, homeowners’ borrowing constraints are relaxed with 
house prices increases, stimulating consumption (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; 
Mian and Sufi, 2014). In this framework, and given that the residential property is 
non-liquid, households confronted with their house price appreciation may be 
compelled to increase debt holdings as a way to smooth consumption over time, 
adjusting their expenditure levels to their new perceived wealth. In fact, to 
understand the drivers of households’ indebtedness it is central to take into 
account the role played by households’ house price perceptions on their decision 
to demand credit. 
This paper studies the effects of a change in housing wealth, as perceived 
by its homeowner and compared with its acquisition cost, on the average amounts 
of debt held by Portuguese households. The study relies on microdata retrieved 
from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCN, 2013) and focus on 
the impact on the variation in debt accumulated by households from an increase 
in housing valuation, analysing total debt, mortgage debt, and non-mortgage debt. 
Given that the main residence represents at once the major share of homeowners’ 
total assets and wealth and the major share of their total debt, it seems natural to 
inspect if perceived wealth from its valuation encourages taking debt up to risky 
levels. To this end, additional estimations are run to capture housing wealth 
effects on over-indebtedness relying on a measure of risk built from the 
combination of three standard thresholds for risky debt.  
The paper is different from the existing literature in four aspects. First, by 
gauging housing wealth through household appraisal of house prices, 
distinguishing housing total appreciation from its average annual appreciation. 
Economic psychology has been emphasizing how perceptions are biased and 
mould household financial decisions implying that one should consider them to 
study households’ behaviours. Second, by seizing housing wealth effects on debt 
rather than on consumption. Homeowners that are liquidity constrained from the 
residential property acquisition, face an opportunity to access other consumption 
goods through debt whenever the housing markets signal an upsurge. Third, by 
studying over-indebtedness, an issue often neglected in the literature. A 
household with high outstanding liabilities is most likely a homeowner that 
borrowed to buy the residential property and has a dwelling as a warranty. 
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Fourth, by refining the analysis taking into account households’ distribution by 
income and wealth and performing estimations to perceive if there are significant 
differences in households’ response to housing wealth across their economic 
distribution.   
Findings indicate that households respond to housing wealth when 
deciding how much debt to accumulate, however with opposite sensibilities and 
different magnitudes given the measure of housing wealth. These suggest that the 
type of perception chosen to seizure housing wealth effects is not irrelevant.  
Moreover, households were shown to reverse their behaviours if their choice 
pertains mortgage debt or non-mortgage debt, meaning they take into account in 
their decisions which type of counter-part they are getting against their liabilities, 
if either a consumption good that is a reliable asset as well, or just a consumption 
good. Lastly, results by income and wealth indicated lower-income households 
more prone to use housing as collateral while wealthier households displayed 
relatively higher over-indebtedness ratios from housing wealth.  
The paper unfolds as follows. Next section looks at the most relevant 
literature on this subject. Section 3 presents the model variables, the data and the 
methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses estimations results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Within traditional economic theory, debt is a side-effect of households’ 
consumption decisions, as in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)’s life-cycle model 
and in Friedman (1957)’s permanent income hypothesis. Acting in complete 
markets, forward-looking consumers choose an even pattern of current and future 
consumption to maximize lifetime utility given their budget constraint. The life-
cycle profile of savings resembles a characteristic hump-shaped curve with 
indebtedness occurring in an early lifetime, and retirement depleting individual 
savings. The more the household income flow is hump-shaped, the higher the level 
of debt needed to smooth out consumption. Lifetime wealth that comprises 




The newer versions of these models introduced uncertainty together with 
a precautionary motive for saving (Skinner, 1987). In the buffer-stock savings 
model (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1992) consumers define a target wealth-to-income 
ratio and savings adjust given precautionary motives, impatience of consumers 
who heavily discount the future, and their borrowing constraints in imperfect 
credit markets. Consumers dissave whenever the wealth stock is above its target, 
which is typical of economic expansions, while along economic recessions savings 
increase due to prudent behaviours triggered by pessimism with respect to 
employment. 
Relying on these micro-foundations, a special class of macroeconomic 
models performs simulations to test if there is symmetry on the housing wealth 
effects on consumption along the upward and downward trend of the business 
cycle. In these models, housing and consumption enter the households’ utility, the 
housing can be used as collateral for new loans, and house prices fluctuations 
affect both households’ borrowing capacity and the return from producing new 
houses (Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). By loosening the collateral 
constraint of borrowers and by the associated wealth effect, increases in housing 
demand or housing prices boost credit, increasing their access to consumption 
(Lambertini et al, 2013; Christensen et al, 2016; Kim and Chung, 2016; Rubio and 
Carrasco-Gallego, 2016). The asymmetric effects of housing booms and busts may 
then be related to the extent of housing collateral constraints. Along the upward 
trend of the business cycle, the expansion of housing wealth from the increase in 
housing prices smooths households’ collateral constraints, fuelling debt-driven 
consumption (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2017). As soon as the house prices start to 
decline, collateral constraints shrink consumption possibilities and accentuate the 
economic depression. In these frameworks, expectations of rising house prices 
produce a quantitative impact on macroeconomic fluctuations, changing 
mortgage credit and consumption. Kuang (2014) models the relation between 
housing and credit cycles, emphasizing the reinforcing role that seems to exist 
between house prices, optimism and credit, the later on its turn reinforcing the 
cycle of optimism and increasing house prices, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The possibility that the recent house price steep march represented a speculative 
bubble was approached by Burnside et al (2016) who explored the role of social 
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interactions among agents with heterogeneous beliefs. The housing market was 
shown to be sensitive to anticipated beliefs of macroeconomic developments and 
to generate business cycle fluctuations.  
Shiller (2007) had highlighted the need to consider behavioural features to 
understand housing markets and interpret the origins of the US house bubble. 
According to this author, there is a feedback mechanism in which past price 
increases nurture future prices expectations until the first drop in prices makes 
the bubble burst. A story told by the public and by the media contaminates 
households’ perceptions and generate what Shiller designates a social epidemic of 
optimism for real estate, wherein the impression of owning a unique property 
whose value is about to increase leads households to raise consumption, boosting 
up the economy. To focus on wealth effects the empirical analysis should rely on 
microdata keeping in mind that housing dominates households’ portfolios. 
Engelhardt (1996) was a founder of these studies, showing that housing capital 
gains increase the propensity to consume, however without symmetry in 
households’ responses to losses and gains, losses increasing other forms of non-
housing savings but gains not changing consumers' savings behaviour. Campbell 
and Cocco (2007) estimated the house price elasticity of consumption, 
differentiating old homeowners whose elasticity was about 1.7 from young 
renters with a close to zero effect. In both cases, these effects were found to be 
more significant for credit-constrained households.  Muellbauer and Murata 
(2009) focused on land prices in Japan and found negative wealth effects on 
consumption that they attributed to underdeveloped credit markets and to 
inheritance taxes favouring land and housing. Aron et al. (2012) comparing Japan, 
the UK, and the US confirmed this result and claimed that different degrees of 
credit market liberalization are responsible for different housing wealth effects 
for these countries, and namely for the negative effect in Japan’s case. Mian et al 
(2013) estimated a positive housing wealth effect on consumption but with 
pronounced regional heterogeneity within the US, poorer regions or regions 
where households were more leveraged displaying a higher marginal propensity 
to consume out of housing. Arrondel et al (2015) found a wealth effect changing 
across the wealth distribution for both housing wealth and financial assets, being 
higher in the bottom of the wealth distribution and for financial assets.   
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A strand of the empirical literature has focused on the role of housing as 
collateral for new loans (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2007). Oikarinen (2009) shows 
that house prices cause consumption loans to increase, accentuating the business 
cycle and the fragility of the financial sector, while Gimeno and Martínez-Carrascal 
(2010) claim that on one hand the collateral from house prices determines 
households’ borrowing capacity, and on the other hand fluctuations in house 
prices change housing wealth, defining the level of households’ expenditures and 
borrowing, and even contribute to a sense of no over-indebtedness.  For Cooper 
(2013), the additional collateral from changes in housing values impact 
consumption of borrowing constrained households, in line with Mian and Sufi 
(2014)’s results who sustain that borrowed constrained households are more 
prone to spend from housing wealth. 
Common causes could also be explaining the correlation between house 
prices and consumption. A shock over an underlying variable, such as income 
expectations, would move house prices and consumption in the same direction 
(Attanasio et al, 2009). A permanent increase in factor productivity would affect 
together agents’ current wages and future wages expectations causing a pro-
cyclical movement of both consumption and house prices. A monetary policy 
shock could be an additional common cause (e.g. Robstad, 2017). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. The Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
 
This paper builds on household-level data collected from the first wave of the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which took place during the 
second quarter of 2010. The HFCS is run by the European Central Bank and 
pretends to be representative of each country population. In the Portuguese case, 
8800 households were interviewed and results were reported for 4404. The 
survey contains information on wealth, income, and socio-demographics such as 
the age of the household head and household composition, education, the region 
where the household lives, homeownership status, and total indebtedness, 
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distinguishing mortgage debt from non-mortgage debt. Households’ financial 
constraints are also reported, along with negative past events. 
The unit of observation of the empirical model is the household, but socio-
economic data was collected at the individual level. For that purpose, the 
household representative was identified with the adult male whenever possible, 
eliminating heterogeneity through gender (e.g., Costa and Farinha, 2012). To 
capture housing wealth effects the analysis focus on the population of 
homeowners corresponding to 2986 households.  
 
3.2. Dependent and explanatory variables 
 
To examine the effect of perceived house prices on debt, this study considers the 
following dependent variables: total debt, mortgage debt, non-mortgage debt of 
households who also hold mortgage debt, non-mortgage debt of households who 
do not hold mortgage debt, and a ratio of over-indebtedness.  The first four 
variables capture households total outstanding liabilities measured in euros as 
reported by the HFCS.  
The measure of risky indebtedness is a composite variable built combining 
indicators of alerting indebtedness amounts. The first indicator considers extreme 
a level of debt greater than 3-fold the household annual income. The second 
indicator classifies as extreme a debt amount greater than 75 percent of the 
household wealth. The third measure compares debt service to household income 
and the alarming threshold is established at 40 percent. The following ratio was 
calculated for each of these thresholds:  =  − /
 − , 
where  is the measure of over-indebtedness for indicator  and household ,   
is the ratio of type  over-indebtedness of household  ,   is the threshold ratio 
defined for indicator , and 
  is the maximum value observed for indicator  
across the households distribution. The ratio of risky indebtedness of each 
household , is the average value of the three indicators: 
 =  /3. 
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This variable is positive for households displaying over-indebtedness. 
The main explanatory variables appraise the valuation of the residential 
property along tenure years comparing the "property value at the time of its 
acquisition" with the "current price of household main residence" as reported by 
the household. Two variables were considered: the rate of housing valuation as 
the ratio between the main residence current price and at the time of its 
acquisition, and the average annual rate of housing valuation as the former ratio 
normalized by tenure years. Additional explanatory variables are tenure years 
and the dummy variable homeownership controlling for households who have 
bought or built their main residence. Lastly, housing initial equity measures the 
difference between housing acquisition price and the amount of credit borrowed 
to purchase it.   
Age, marital status, and education refer to features of the reference person. 
Dummy variables are used to identify the marital status married, widow(er), and 
divorced (the reference group here being those that are single), and the highest 
complete education degree, distinguishing between secondary and tertiary 
education from the reference group of those who have up to a primary school 
diploma.  
Household types are captured by dummy variables that distinguish 
households with only adults, households with adults and dependants, and those 
with only one adult and dependants. Dependants are individuals younger than 25 
years old who do not receive income, cohabit with the household and are not the 
household reference person or his spouse/partner, or his parent/grandparent. 
The number of dependants, the total number of individuals and the number of 
employed adults in the household are further covariates.  
Household income sums all incomes received by household members 
during 2009, the year that precedes the interview, and is converted into 
logarithms. It includes regular income, namely employee income, income from 
self-employment, income from pensions and other regular social transfers, and 
further income that is the outcome of household's assets portfolio, comprising 
private business and financial assets, real estate property and other sources, and 
from regular private transfers. To examine the extent to which the impact of 
income on the likelihood of having debt differed among those who have a high 
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school diploma and the others an interaction term between the two variables is 
considered. Total wealth sums up real and financial wealth abridging the value of 
real estates, vehicles, businesses, and valuables, the set of household deposits, 
bonds, pension plans, mutual funds and other financial assets and is also 
converted in logarithms.  
To assess the impact of the household financial status, the model considers 
two dummy variables: credit constraints and past adverse change(s). Credit 
constraints follow the definitions from the HFCN (2013) by classifying as credit 
constrained respondents who have responded having applied for a loan in the 
previous three years and have been totally or partially turned down or have 
received a lower amount than what they had applied for. This dummy also 
comprises respondents who reported not having applied for a loan due to 
perceived credit constraints.     Past adverse change(s) captures households who 
have reported that at least one of its members had unfavourable job changes, a 
substantial reduction in their net worth in the three years that precede the 
interview, an unusually low income during the year reported in the interview, or 
an increase in regular expenses.  
 
3.3. Debt and housing valuation 
 
The Portuguese housing market is noticeable for the prevalence of 
homeownership.  According to the HFCS, about 72% of Portuguese households 
held a residential property in 2010, a fact that can be ascribed to a poorly 
legislated and incipient housing renting market. Table 1 displays descriptive 
statistics for the models’ dependent and explanatory variables. The typical 
individual in this sample is a 56 years old married male with basic education, 
owning his residential property for 22 years during which the dwelling total 
valuation was 18.7 fold against an average annual valuation of 0.5. The household 
average annual income is 21956 euros while the average accumulated wealth 
makes a total of 224750 euros. Other points of interest are the report of odd 
events, the majority of these individuals recording past adverse changes but only 
2.9% feeling liquidity constrained.  
(Table 1 about here) 
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Table 2 reports summary statistics for positive levels of debt and over-debt 
as well as the percentage of the population that has reported holding debt. The 
average amount of outstanding liabilities from a residential property, held by 37% 
of the population, was higher than the average amount of total debt that belonged 
to 44.2% of the population. About 7.3% of the population of homeowners 
accumulated exclusively non-mortgage debt while a significant group of around 
17.1% of Portuguese homeowners revealed being over-indebted given at least one 
of the three formerly defined criteria.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 displays average debt amounts against the quartiles for housing 
wealth variables and tenure years. The similarities between the distributions of 
the rate of housing valuation and tenure years are evident, the size of debt and of 
risky indebtedness decreasing when moving from the bottom to the top of the 
distribution. The amounts of pure non-mortgage debt are the exception, the 
distribution exhibiting an inverted U-shape with a peak at the third quartile. Debt 
by quartiles of the average annual rate of housing valuation describes an inverted 
U-shape with a peak at the second quartile. As a whole, the distributions suggest 
that the size of debt is associated with homeownership, that debt fades with time, 
and that the housing wealth effects on debt may differ. Buying a residential 
property represents a considerable financial effort for Portuguese households, felt 
mainly immediately after its acquisition, or when its valuation is low. 




In the next sections, housing wealth effects on debt are estimated by applying the 
Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) that regresses a dependent variable with many 
observations clustered at a certain limiting value. In these cases, to avoid biased 
and inconsistent estimates it is not possible to use linear regression models such 
as ordinary least squares that assume that the dependent variable is normally 
distributed. The full sample can be considered with the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the Tobit model, specified as follows: ∗ =  + ,                                                                                                                              (1) 
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where   is a vector of explanatory variables and   is the normally and 
independently distributed error term. ∗	is a latent variable that is observed for 
values greater than zero (positive values of debt, and over-indebtedness) and 
censored for the value zero. Its counterpart is the observed variable  defined as: 
 =  ∗	!	∗ > 00	!	∗ = 0 .                                                                                                                     (2) 
It is possible to calculate the unconditional and conditional marginal effects 
on the observed variable by considering or not the information that the observed 
variable is positive. These marginal effects are represented by the expressions: $%&'/$ = (&)',                                                                                                                (4) $%&|∗ > 0'/$ = &1 − &)', − ,-',                                                                           (5) 
where , = !&)'/(&)'  with !  and (  respectively the probability and the 
cumulative density functions, ) = ′//, and / is the standard error of the error 
term. 
 
4. Model estimations 
 
4.1. Total debt and mortgage debt 
 
The first step is to examine the overall relationship between housing wealth 
perception and the most common form of debt among homeowners as a baseline 
model. Table 4 exhibits the maximum likelihood estimation results of the Tobit 
model and the marginal effects conditional on positive values of the latent variable 
for both total debt and mortgage debt. Features of the population are held at mean 
values, and then changed one by one, to estimate a ceteris paribus effect on 
dependent variables of a variation in each attribute.  
The set of results display significant resemblances, exposing debt as mostly 
the consequence of purchasing a residential property. The estimates for the 
marginal effects of the housing variables were all significant at least at the 1% 
level corroborating the strong connection between being a homeowner and 
holding debt. However, the two main variables that capture housing wealth 
perception revealed opposite effects on the variation of outstanding liabilities. The 
size of debt and mortgage debt were shown to increase with the rate of housing 
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valuation, and with having had the obligation of incurring costs to purchase 
housing, but to decrease with the average annual rate of housing valuation, with 
tenure years, and with initial equity. For those with positive debt, a unit increase 
in the rate of housing valuation was shown to expand debt and mortgage debt by 
respectively 166 and 197 euros. Yet, a unit increase in the average annual rate of 
housing valuation displayed conditional marginal effects of -7559 and -8367 euros 
on debt and mortgage debt, respectively. It seems that households change their 
housing wealth perception if doing straight comparisons between housing initial 
price and its apparent valuation, or if normalizing this increase by tenure years.   
Two factors may be contributing to these findings. First, most valued 
houses may be those bought at a longer time at relatively lower prices, their 
owners have residual mortgage debt from the long-term contract celebrated at the 
moment of its purchase or have contracted new mortgage debt to refurbish it. 
Secondly, debt involves a planned financial effort that is assessed by households 
on an annual basis and compared to its annual valuation, a comparison that may 
incite paying off debt. A greater annual valuation on average may encourage 
homeowners to write off their outstanding liabilities with what might have been 
understood as a reliable and promising asset. If this is the case, then the housing 
wealth effect on mortgage debt is to incite moving from partial tenure to complete 
tenure in light of what is faced as a solid investment worth allocating wealth to. 
The results on other variables that control for housing impact reinforce the 
contribution of homeownership to the size of debt and mortgage debt. The 
negative effect from tenure years validates homeowners planning their housing 
financial effort within a given lifetime period. Not surprisingly, a lower initial 
financial effort acted in the same direction. Overall, homeowners’ debt is the 
reverse of being able to invest in housing as they simultaneously consume it. 
Further control variables in the model displayed expected results. The 
most relevant finding is household composition moulding outstanding liabilities: 
debt/mortgage-debt amplified among households in which several adults and 
dependants cohabit, as with the number of dependants, and employed adults. One 
additional individual in the household decreased debt holdings, possibly 
indicating poorer households in which many elements are forced to cohabit. 
Generally, outstanding liabilities are higher among medium-size younger 
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households with dependants, especially if the reference person has become 
divorced.  
Income and wealth were seen to increase debt and mortgage debt holdings, 
the magnitude of the wealth effect being greater than income, perhaps reflecting 
collateral reasons. Nevertheless, the highly educated income was negatively 
related to their liabilities, pointing to heterogeneous responses of the population 
to debt.  The inversion of the coefficient suggests some form of financial literacy 
with higher education increasing risk-aversion.  
Debt amounts are often related to credit constraints or unexpected and 
adverse events.  Liquidity constraints were found to surge debt, suggesting 
reverse causality, namely households with higher outstanding liabilities reporting 
to be credit constrained. Another possible explanation, and since credit 
constraints are not statistically significant for mortgage debt, is this representing 
the use of credit cards and their high interest rates. The level of debt accumulated 
by households was also found directly related to unexpected odd events, 
discarding precautionary savings motives across the Portuguese population, 
instead placing debt as a buffer, assuring maintenance of past life patterns until 
income recovers.   
 
4.2. Non-mortgage debt 
 
Previous section estimations may be capturing causality and even endogeneity 
between house prices and especially mortgage debt. One cannot exclude the 
possibility that increases in house prices drive increased debt. However, if the 
model focus on non-mortgage debt it is possible to seizure housing wealth effects 
on consumption. The estimations for non-mortgage debt are displayed in Table 5, 
distinguishing two dependent variables: outstanding non-mortgage liabilities of 
households that also hold mortgage debt (non-mortgage debt) from non-
mortgage debt levels when there is no outstanding liability related to housing 
acquisition possibly implying that mortgage debt has already been paid off (only 
non-mortgage debt). The loss of statistical significance of the coefficients that 
capture housing effects clearly stood out in the first model, indicating that the 
appraisal of housing wealth is not relevant for households deciding the amount of 
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non-mortgage loans to undertake when they still hold mortgage debt. A changed 
scenario was offered for only non-mortgage debt: across households with positive 
non-mortgage debt, a one unit increase in the rate of housing valuation 
contributed to decreasing its size in about 76 euros. The estimations showed 
symmetric effects with respect to the average annual rate of housing valuation, 
augmenting debt holdings by 2291 euros. Besides the inversion of the housing 
wealth coefficients, these are also symmetrical to those estimated for total debt 
and mortgage debt, revealing reverse housing wealth effects by type of debt. 
Findings suggest that homeowners without outstanding liabilities from a costly 
and indispensable consumption good (their residential property), respond 
positively to relatively higher annual valuations of what is most likely their main 
asset and borrow to increase consumption as if recording a backwards subjective 
impatience. If impatience dominates households’ decisions it is natural to expect 
this confidence response, the perception of increased wealth increasing current 
outstanding liabilities for purchasing consumption goods. Moreover, results 
expose distinct perceived housing wealth effects on further loans depending if 
they are meant to invest in the main asset or to consume once the investment 
acquisition has been accomplished.  
Home acquisition was found to limit households’ additional financial 
decisions, dropping non-mortgage debt holdings by 1103 euros. One extra tenure 
year allows households to overcome these behavioural constraints inducing the 
increase of loans to fulfil consumption needs.  Also contrary to the effect on 
mortgage debt, a higher initial housing equity displayed a positive effect on 
consumption debt. The inversion of the signs of the coefficients for the set of 
housing variables when compared to the estimations for mortgage debt 
disclosures housing as a special good for homeowners. They consume it by doing 
an investment that retains their largest wealth share, possibly decreasing their 
cash on hand and limiting the access to other consumption goods. When 
homeowners perceive the housing market signalling an increase in their lifetime 
savings they feel they can adjust their consumption levels upwards, but have to 
demand for credit to do it. By contracting new loans, these households react as if 
anticipating the wealth effects as permanent. The fact that these results are only 
confirmed for those that do not hold outstanding liabilities with a mortgage, 
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reveals precautionary behaviours among Portuguese homeowners, taking their 
chances with consumption based on housing wealth after finishing investing on 
their lifetime security. Another possibility for the increase in mortgage debt is a 
substitution effect from the increase in house prices pushing households to 
increase the consumption of consumption goods whose relative price has become 
cheaper and that is backed by the double nature of housing.  
Liquidity constrained households were predicted to hold higher non-
mortgage outstanding liabilities, a puzzling fact that may again relate to reverse 
causality on the one hand, and to the use of credit cards by those that have less 
access to credit, on the other.  
Socio-economic variables seem to play a minor role in explaining the size 
of non-mortgage debt held by the Portuguese population that does not have 
mortgage liabilities. The exception was households with dependants and the 
number of employed adults that were found positively related to non-mortgage 
debt. However, the set of socio-economic variables becomes relevant to explain 
the size of non-mortgage debt for households holding mortgage liabilities, debt 
increasing with income, and decreasing with age. Across the households 
distribution, a 1% increase in income produced an increase of about 864 euros on 
non-mortgage debt, as if a relative position at the top of income distribution 
induced optimism about households’ future income expectations, and incited an 
increase in consumption through debt.  
 
4.3. Over-indebtedness estimation results 
 
About 17.1% of Portuguese households exhibited very high outstanding liabilities 
and were classified as over-indebted. The results for the estimations of over-debt 
are displayed in Table 6. A first overall impression is the resemblance between the 
signs of the coefficients for these estimations and those found for debt and 
mortgage debt, even if given the loss of statistical significance of several variables, 
the new model contains fewer variables. The rate of housing valuation was shown 
to be positively related with the over-debt ratio, while the average annual rate of 
housing valuation were found to be negatively related, as were tenure years and 
housing initial equity. The statistical significance of these coefficients 
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corroborates the relevance of homeownership for over-indebtedness. Since the 
number of tenure years contributes to erode over-indebtedness, the risk of 
defaulting seems to be higher for households owning newer residential 
properties, implying impatience as a cause of over-debt. 
(Table 6 about here) 
 If the perception of housing valuation irrespectively of tenure years 
increases the over-debt ratio, when perception is a relative concept – how much 
did the residential property valued per year –the same risk-aversion behaviour 
that was found in the models for debt and mortgage debt emerged, as if a relatively 
well annually valued residential property triggered precautionary behaviours 
among households. Again, this indicates a better control of closer information than 
of a time distant one, with households’ perception becoming more accurate when 
comparing the mortgage debt annual interest costs to their annual housing 
valuation. Initial housing equity was estimated to decrease the ratio of risky 
indebtedness reaffirming housing contribution to households’ liabilities and 
showing that risky behaviours are more likely in adverse contexts. 
Control variables partially replicated the results found for debt and 
mortgage debt, such as age decreasing the magnitude of over-indebtedness, or the 
number of employed adults increasing it. Total wealth was positively related to 
this ratio, signalling that financial institutions demand a warranty in exchange for 
loans and indicating that it is somehow difficult for households to hold debt above 
75% of their total wealth. On its turn, a one percent increase in income was seen 
to decrease the ratio of over-debt which is most likely the consequence of having 
built it from two income thresholds. It is worth noticing the replication of results 
for past adverse changes and liquidity constraints, both statistically significant at 
the 1% level, and displaying positive effects, suggesting that risky behaviours are 
not necessarily deliberate but rather the result of unpredicted detrimental events 
such as unemployment. 
Even if over-debt is the joint result of outstanding liabilities from a 
mortgage and consumption goods, the estimations point to housing as the main 
driver of risky debt. Housing is highly valued by homeowners who consume it and 




4.4. High and low-income groups 
 
The size of debt might be associated with socio-economic features of the 
population, namely their relative income or relative wealth.  Poorer households 
can be more dependent on credit to smooth consumption, especially if they 
anticipate an increase in future income within a context of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the poorer may be more credit constrained, the richer having easier 
access to debt since they have collateral. In each case, the relative levels of income 
and wealth could lead to different debt behaviours in response to housing 
valuation. To this end, further estimations were performed for different groups of 
households classified by their total annual income and by total wealth. Table 7 
displays average debt levels and risky indebtedness for households located at the 
top and the bottom income and wealth distributions.  For both variables, the top 
group is shown to hold higher amounts of debt, the disparities being greater for 
average mortgage liabilities than for non-mortgage. Higher income reduces over-
indebtedness while higher wealth increases it.  
(Table 7 about here) 
The estimations for non-mortgage debt were performed for the 20th and 
90th income percentile and can be found in Table 8. Additional estimations took 
into account extreme levels of households’ wealth, however the model variables 
became mostly non-statistically significant. Except for homeownership, the two 
models exhibit equal signs for the coefficients of housing wealth and in line with 
those found for total population, and apart from tenure years, their magnitude is 
significantly higher for the bottom income population. It seems that those who 
earn less are relatively more impatient, recurring significantly more to loans to 
fulfil their consumption needs, the housing wealth effect tending to be more 
intensively felt by this spectrum of the population that is relatively income 
constrained in their access to consumption goods. The fact that homeownership 
contributes to increase the size of outstanding liabilities with consumption for this 
group but to decrease it for the richer reinforces the intuition that the residential 
property is used to smooth their consumption. In addition, wealth is shown to 
increase debt holdings among the poorer, while it has a negative effect on the 
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upper-income group, confirming that collateral effects are more relevant for 
poorer households.  
(Table 8 about here) 
Among the estimations for risky indebtedness by income and wealth, 
wealth disparities results are more statistically significant than income 
differences and are replicated in Table 9.  The magnitude of the coefficients is the 
main difference detected between the two extreme wealth quartiles, the poorer 
displaying larger absolute values for the estimated coefficients and relatively 
larger than the baseline model. It seems that if impatience related to the valuation 
of the main asset is the driver of over-indebtedness, the poorer reveal more 
prudent behaviours than the richer given their average annual rate of housing 
valuation. The requirements imposed by financial institutions to lend may be 
contributing to these findings, being less demanding with those that exhibit 
warranties contributing as such to their risk of default. 




This study tested at the household level the assumption that housing wealth as 
appraised by homeowners can mould their decision on how much debt to hold. 
Two different measures of wealth perception were built based on housing relative 
price changes, both showing to be strongly related to the amounts borrowed by 
households for mortgage and/or non-mortgage purposes, and significant in 
explaining over-indebtedness. Results proved to be conditioned to the variable 
chosen to proxy housing wealth effects and to the type of debt that is responding 
to these perceptions.  Mortgage debt, which is a less secured form of debt, reacts 
positively to the average annual rate of housing valuation but negatively to its 
absolute value, suggesting that households that throughout time experience 
relatively higher housing valuations will tend to feel confident and contract new 
loans for consumption purposes with the housing market behaviour feeding their 
impatience.  The estimations for risky indebtedness, on their turn, indicated that 
it mainly mirrors mortgage debt results suggesting that if over-debt is the 
outcome of a bad decision it will be mostly related to housing acquisition. 
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Noteworthy is the significance of past adverse changes to explain unsafe debt 
holdings revealing that these are most likely a consequence of the inability to 
predict decreases in income from hardship such as unemployment periods.  
Estimations by classes of income and wealth, focusing on the extremes of these 
distributions, showed dissimilar debt responses to housing wealth from distinct 
population groups, even if both groups exhibit a significant housing wealth effect.  
Low-income homeowners were predicted to be relatively more indebted than 
high-income ones and to apparently recur more to housing as collateral for 
consumption. The wealthier displayed higher levels of over-indebtedness 
suggesting that the perception of a valuable collateral can lead to insecure 
behaviours nurtured by financial institutions. 
This paper has several practical implications. First, households that face a 
relatively rapid valuation of their main residence will tend to contract additional 
loans to increase consumption, revealing that homeowners update the 
information on their intertemporal human wealth in response to perceived 
movements in the housing market. This optimistic effect from house prices 
appreciation will be felt stronger within the lower income group possibly more 
liquidity constrained.  Second, if over-debt is related to owning a house and having 
contracted long-run debt to purchase it, being richer tends to increase the relative 
amount of risky loans, those with lower real and financial wealth displaying lower 
risky ratios most likely since their collateral imposes upper limits to indebtedness.  
In this case, the optimism may belong to the financial institutions that grant loans 
and that face as riskier those with lower wealth, being willing to lend relatively 
higher amounts to richer houses as if facing their risk of default as lower.   
The policy implications of this work are mainly two. First, it is important to 
establish rules for housing evaluation by financial institutions when the purpose 
is to accept it as collateral for credit lending. Since it is not easy to monitor the 
housing market, a better alternative could be to consider the valuations that are 
recorded by the fiscal authorities for mortgage tax purposes. Secondly, since over-
indebtedness seems to be related with the constraints imposed from housing 
acquisition, to decrease the likelihood of default credit market conditions for 
housing purchase should be reconsidered. This would imply a tightening of the 
existing requirements for granting loans against declared wealth and should be 
21 
 
especially more pronounced with respect to what has been practised within the 
group of wealthier households. Nevertheless, since the largest share of Portuguese 
households are homeowners, these credit regulation measures will need to be 
compensated by policy measures to enlarge the housing rental market as for 
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Appendix: Tables  
 
Table 1. Dependent and explanatory variables summary statistics  
Variable Median Mean SD Min Max 
Debt 0 23456.84 43141.84 0 610000 
Mortgage debt 0 22102.14 42209.84 0 610000 
Non-mortgage debt 0 1354.7   6611.608 0 150846 
Only non-mortgage debt 0 675.4471 5372.886 0 150846 
Over-indebtedness 0 0.0062031 0.0292451 0 0.708996 
Home ownership 1 0.8640048   0.3427854 0 1 
Rate of housing valuation 2.42 18.6618 52.71915 .03     771.6 
Average annual rate of housing 
valuation 
0.2 0.5352323    1.020472   .000833    13.3035 
Tenure years 20 22.34875    14.30494 1 81 
Housing initial equity 14900 34325.79 56000.7 -352600 750000 
Age 56 56.48692 14.98011 18 85 
Married 1 0.7118003  0.452927 0 1 
Widow(er) 0 0.1459909     0.353099          0 1 
Divorced 0 0.0687811   0.2530828 0 1 
Secondary education 0 0.1235682   0.32909 0 1 
Higher education 0 0.0888265   0.284496 0 1 
Adults and dependants 0 0.4468878  0.4971738   0 1 
One adult and dependants 0 0.0226929    0.1489233 0 1 
Only adults 0 0.382051    0.4858915 0 1 
Number of dependants 0 0.6186514   0.8638262 0 8 
Total individuals 3 2.775773    1.240738 1 11 
Employed adults 1 1.251675    1.047343 0 6 
Income (log) 9.646011 9.630224      0.8654713        4.65396   13.31232 
Income (log)*Higher education 0 0.9387536 3.016379 0 12.95217 
Total wealth (log) 11.75508 11.78667 0.9439676 6.214608 17.127 
Credit constraints 0 0.0290145 0.167848 0 1 
Past adverse changes 1 0.5132915 0.499826 0 1 








Table 2. Households debt and over-debt summary statistics  
 Participation rate (%) Mean 
Total debt 44.2 53040.84 
Mortgage debt 37.0 59813.79 
Non-mortgage debt 17.4 7766.32 
Only non-mortgage debt 7.3 9287.649 
Over-indebtedness 17.1 0.0362692 
Note: All values are in euros. Participation rates are the fraction of all households with 
non-zero debt or over-debt and were calculated using population weights. The mean 





Table 3. Average debt by quartiles of the rate of housing valuation, of the average 
annual rate of housing valuation distribution, and of tenure years 
Variable Rate of housing valuation 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Total debt 48866.63 28683.14 9561.12 2478.53 
Mortgage debt 47394.91 26804.54 7987.86 2044.70 
Non-mortgage debt 1471.725 1878.608 1573.26 433.83 
Only non-mortgage debt 365.109 1045.445 1004.669 302.614 
Over-indebtedness 0.01638 0.00513 0.00131 0.00054 
 Average annual rate of housing valuation 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Total debt 19855.85 33870.2 25609.66 13688.44 
Mortgage debt 18339.05 32014.3 24153.65 13129.89 
Non-mortgage debt 1516.792 1855.896 1456.019 558.552 
Only non-mortgage debt 635.341 854.546 860.997 336.289 
Over-indebtedness 0. .00565 0 .0076 0. 00793 0. 00351 
 Tenure years 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Total debt 54603.16 18229.57 6105.9 1900.994 
Mortgage debt 52923.47 16383.32 4872.12 1315.411 
Non-mortgage debt 1679.688 1846.257 1233.78 585.5834 
Only non-mortgage debt 583.129 668.4589 988.898 513.2394 
Over-indebtedness 0. 0157 0. 00348 0. 00119 0.00039 




Table 4. Debt and mortgage debt regression results 
 Total debt Mortgage debt 
 Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
































































4375.0086   
(9915.463) 










Secondary education 1526.20782 
(4397.179) 
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(46863.334) 






2736.978   
(1817.5444) 

























































































 Number of obs                  
F( 22, 2964)                  
Prob > F                 
2986          
35.788                
0 
Number of obs                  
F( 22, 2964)                  
Prob > F                 
2986             
32.778                
0 
 Log pseudolikelihood         
Pseudo R2 
-15404153.8    
0.005712 
Log pseudolikelihood             -13024231.8 
Pseudo R2                                           0.06516 
  /0 52024.812  /0 56601.178 
 
Note: t-statistics within parentheses. ***, **, * and † indicate that the variable is statistically significant at 




Table 5. Non-mortgage debt and only non-mortgage debt regression results 
 Non-mortgage debt Only non-mortgage debt 
 Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Home ownership -2244.9268     
(1861.8128) 
-409.67196    
(347.86034) 
-7611.2374*                       
(3155.648) 
-1103.087*                             
(476.60392) 
Rate of housing 
valuation 
-18.8877612    
(95.000776) 
-3.35836104   
(16.89263) 
-556.81756**                             
(204.0103) 
-76.143882**                
(27.25841)  
Average annual rate of 
housing valuation 
-3282.9418   
(3870.2474) 
-584.3495   
(689.45816) 
16755.456*                                
(7095.1654) 
2291.236*                                
(954.5156) 
Tenure years -97.391808   
(82.28806) 
-17.332848   
(14.674712) 
412.12168**                     
 (146.30172) 
56.359084**                         
(19.5798) 
Housing initial equity -0.01982456†  
(0.01134756)  
-0.00352808†   
(0.00201724) 
0.07342518***                           
(0.01944848) 
0.01004202***                    
(0.00263886) 
Age -153.26778*   
(67.283614) 
-27.276744*    
(11.985038) 
23.447836                          
 (121.44194) 
3.207168                              
(16.607882) 
Married -756.7603     
(2282.789) 
-130.1169     
(395.52392) 
-3563.697                               
(4255.44) 
-480.95648                           
(588.00066) 
Widow(er) 6249.5944†    
(3267.3148) 
1197.3482†    
(640.55182) 
7217.53                                   
 (5530.7524)  
1088.3194                              
(837.97666) 
Divorced 5565.8782*    
(2721.0242) 
1054.8668*    
(515.1808)  
5447.9506                                 
(5141.0056) 
806.15198                            
(760.24162) 
Secondary education 3696.2168†     
(2057.7936) 
608.53724†   
(351.85828) 
2690.592                                
 (3796.2154) 
367.50294                                
(527.715) 




12409.7562                      
 (42632.592) 
1904.36496                             
(7197.383) 




10283.616†                              
(5711.5444) 
1363.5192†                              
(718.8391) 






16791.226*                            
(6986.677)   
2387.5124*                          
(1054.9436) 




4704.269                            
(5998.1838) 
588.84472                          
(737.00528)   




2194.9864                            
  (2608.7716) 
300.191                                  
(356.38276) 




2892.2488                          
  (1918.289) 
395.55828                         
(262.39352) 




3468.173*                                  
(1764.1068) 
474.3236*                                
(241.93104) 
Income (log) 4853.1638*** 
(1235.4564)   
863.7305***  
(214.67246) 
3469.0354†                              
(2035.0904) 








-1935.0268                            
 (4007.1936) 
-264.67722                       
(547.48222) 




434.68258                                
(1383.0266) 
59.4479                                       
(189.10634) 
Credit constraints 17447.074*** 
(3154.1978)   
3105.0452*** 
(546.65822)   
14039.466**                   
 (5401.4174) 
1920.0832**                         
(729.78986) 




1255.1152                           
  (2455.3956) 
171.62148                           
(335.4469) 
Constant -71846.524***  
(17785.148)   
 -108183.5***                    
 (32299.96) 
 
 Number of obs                  
F( 22, 2964)                  
Prob > F                 
2986          
4.82                
0 
Number of obs                  
F( 22, 2964)                  
Prob > F                 
2986             
2.22       
0.00098 
 Log pseudolikelihood         
Pseudo R2 
-6002531.88    
0.02812 
Log pseudolikelihood             -2722947.62 
Pseudo R2                                           0.02536 
  /0 19028.194  /0 26833.736 
Note: t-statistics within parentheses. ***, **, * and † indicate that the variable is statistically significant at 






Table 6. Over-indebtedness regression results 
 Over - indebtedness 
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
Rate of housing valuation 0.00106138***       
(0.00025792) 
0.00014608***         
(0.0000325)       
Average annual rate of 
housing valuation 
-0.0534015***             
(0.01515066) 
-0.00734848***             
(0.00194712) 
Tenure years -0.00416616***             
(0.0006703)  
-0.00057336***             
(0.0000768)   
Housing initial equity -0.000000315***             
(0.00000006222)   
-0.00000004334***   
(0.000000008382) 
Age -0.00197052***              
(0.00029872) 
-0.0002712***               
(0.00004186)  
Secondary education -0.01086756                   
(0.00742028) 
-0.0011921                
(0.00079422) 
Higher education 0.28463316**                  
(0.109453)    
0.12257328             
(0.09116198)   
Employed adults 0.00972004*              
(0.00477012) 
0.00133682*                
(0.00065866) 
Income (log) -0.0428538***           
(0.00814416)   
-0.00589592***       
(0.00104974)    
Income (log)*Higher 
education 
-0.02853228**        
(0.01079548)      
-0.00392868**            
(0.00151768)   
Total wealth (log) 0.02354394***         
(0.00515372)     
0.00323984***            
(0.00067446)   
Credit constraints 0.04422858**         
(0.01429094)     
0.00608806**         
(0.00196652)       
Past adverse changes 0.01917968**             
(0.00621296) 
0.00263648**           
(0.00083802)    
Constant 0.22364046***              
(0.06710128) 
 
 Number of obs 2986 
 F( 13, 2973) 8.626 
 Prob > F 0 
Log pseudolikelihood 178754.3 
Pseudo R2 1.66632 
 /0 0.070114 
 
Note: t-statistics within parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the variable is statistically significant at 





Table 7. Debt by income percentiles and wealth quartiles   
Income Total wealth 
 
P20 P90 Q1 Q4 
Total debt 5712.815 50098.24 5947.533 42288.15 
Mortgage debt 5119.69 47284.16 5353.003 40355.86 
Non-mortgage debt 593.1248 2814.08 594.53 1932.29 
Only non-mortgage debt 490.0386 910.8762 400.9575 935.4024 
Over-indebtedness 0. 010577 0. 001556 0. 005934 0. 003767 





Table 8. Only non-mortgage debt regression results for income percentiles 20 
and 90  
 P20 P90 
 Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 














-822.64984***   
52.492496 
-99.96013†   
58.292792 
Average annual rate of 
housing valuation 








Tenure years 602.30176***    
86.651116 




176.70576   
121.62846 
















Married 129740.4***    
3549.4226 






Widow(er) 139987.6***   
2240.8962 












11827.8†      
6558.909 
Secondary education -5017.9486*   
2473.5552 
-188.09424**   
65.922286 
-5835.1552*   
2437.2302 
-64.322616***   
15.152234 




479412.54***   
2571.6478 
219335.82***   
31545.812 






-1571.3034*    
710.53234 
One adult and 
dependants 
-335.73172   
2576.4446 




19071.054    
12198.718 






931.10958   
946.90698 
Number of dependants 147.23494       
1397.345 






Total individuals 5915.7876***    
1030.33184 


















35261.984***   
257.95504 










-5266.6746   
3271.4082 








Credit constraints 15159.828***  
2437.0404 














Constant -603755.76***   
3166.6526 
 -506399.1***   
2913.8052 
 
 Number of obs                  
F( 20, 600)                     
Prob > F                 
598                  
--                      
-- 
Number of obs                  
F( 22, 296)                  
Prob > F                 
298               
994400000                
0 
 Log pseudolikelihood         
Pseudo R2 
-251473.88    
0.09914 
Log pseudolikelihood         
Pseudo R2 
-257573.46    
0.05922 
  /0 24688.194 /0  28226.428 
Note: t-statistics within parentheses. ***, **, * and † indicate that the variable is statistically significant at 
respectively 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 9. Over-indebtedness regression results for wealth quartiles 1 and 4 
 Q1 Q4 
 Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Rate of housing 
valuation 







































-0.00082626*   
0.00034502 
-0.00012712*   
0.00005286 










































Total wealth (log) 0.0361653  
0.02712228 
0.0034594    
0.00257954 




Credit constraints 0.106222*    
0.05357236 
0.01018314†    
0.00523368 
0.01756218   
0.01981548 
0.00269662   
0.00303338 
Past adverse changes 0.01986162   
0.02159356 




0.00133158   
0.0011096 
Constant 0.2032933   
0.2935016 
 0.08867942   
0.08793032 
 
 Number of obs                  
F( 13. 735)                  
Prob > F                 
748                        
3.688                           
0.00004 
Number of obs                  
F( 13. 733)                  
Prob > F                 
746                
2.464                     
0 








 /0 0.121578  /0 0.02755 
    
 
 
 
 
 
